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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
A. Issue
Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(hereinafter “the Rwandan Statute”) states that “[t]he temporal jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend to a period beginning on 1 January 1994
and ending on 31 December 1994.”1 Considering that incitement to commit genocide is
characterized as an inchoate crime in the Travaux Preparatoires of the Genocide
Convention and that acts committed outside of the tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction can be
considered to prove conspiracy to commit genocide, the issue arises as to whether or not
incitement to commit genocide is a continuing crime such that acts committed outside the
temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter
“ICTR”) can be considered in prosecuting an accused.

In other words, the issue

presented is whether an accused can be prosecuted for committing incitement to commit
genocide during times outside of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction of 1994?
This memorandum will examine the ability of the ICTR to consider acts of
incitement to commit genocide which is committed outside of its temporal jurisdiction in
its prosecution of those responsible for the genocide in 1994. Part II of this memorandum
will begin with a brief overview of the effect of inciters had on the 1994 genocide and a
brief background of the establishment of the ICTR and the key reasons behind the
establishment of the one year temporal jurisdiction. Part III will analyze the issue of
whether incitement to commit genocide that occurred outside of the ICTR’s temporal

1

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 7. [Reproduce in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 27]
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jurisdiction can be considered by the ICTR in terms of using that evidence to prosecute
the incitement itself and the use of such evidence to prosecute other genocide related
crimes that occurred within the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR in conjunction with the prosecution of
incitement to commit genocide is unique from every other special tribunal such as the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter “SCSL”). Only the ICTR has a one year temporal
jurisdiction which prevents the prosecution of many of those most responsible for the
genocide that took place in 1994. As such, much of the analysis for this issue can only be
drawn from the decisions made by the ICTR.
i. The ICTR May Not Prosecute Incitement to Commit Genocide Which
Halted Before 1994 as It is Barred By the ICTR’s Temporal Jurisdiction
Absent a Casual Nexus Between the Incitement and the Genocide of 1994
Generally, mainly due to the fact that incitement to commit genocide, because it is
characterized to be an inchoate crime, is considered to be continuing until the completion
of the contemplated acts, the ICTR may not prosecute suspected persons for the
commission of acts in violation of international humanitarian laws that is committed
outside of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction should those acts halt prior to 1994. This is
so because the power to do so is not authorized by the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Moreover the Prosecutor has specifically declined to
pursue such action in at least one instance involving the crime of incitement to commit
genocide because of the limits placed on it by the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR.

2

Since inchoate crimes require simply an act with intent and nothing more, the
Prosecutor will not have the authority to prosecute those crimes in Rwanda if it happened
before 1994.

However, as an inchoate crime, incitements to commit genocide are

considered to be continuing until the last act committed. Therefore, the Prosecutor may
prosecute acts of incitement to commit genocide of an individual which took place prior
to 1994 as long as that individual also incited others to commit genocide in 1994.
Moreover, should the Prosecutor be able to establish a casual nexus between the
incitements that took place prior to 1994 and the genocide that occurred in 1994, the
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR Statute will also allow for the prosecution of those acts.
ii. The ICTR May Allow for the Introduction of Incitements to
Commit Genocide Which Took Place Before 1994 as Evidence to
Prove Elements Required for the Prosecution of a Crime That Took
Place within Its Temporal Jurisdiction
In addition, over the course of its existence, the ICTR have also come to allow for
the introduction of evidence of incitement to commit genocide which took place outside
of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction to be introduced as evidence if it fits under at least
one of three exceptions to the general inadmissibility of pre-1994 evidence: evidence
relevant to an offence continuing into 1994, evidence providing a context or background,
and similar fact evidence. Thus, unless the evidence of prior incitement to commit
genocide fits under one of the three exceptions, the ICTR will not even admit those acts
into evidence to prove certain elements for other crimes that ICTR has the jurisdiction to
prosecute.
In summary, the ICTR may not consider incitements to commit genocide which
took place prior to 1994 as a crime in itself unless it can be proven that it was relevant to
an offense continuing into 1994. Moreover, the ICTR may not consider incitements to
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commit genocide which took place prior to 1994 even as evidence for other crimes unless
it provides a context or background for the crime being prosecuted or was similar to the
facts surrounding the crime being prosecuted. Hence, the temporal jurisdiction of the
ICTR, unless amended, will seriously hamper the ICTR’s role in prosecuting those most
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. As such, incitement to commit genocide is a
continuing crime such that acts committed outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR
can be considered in prosecuting an accused so long as certain conditions are met.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the legal analysis of the issue, in order to understand why the prosecution
of incitement to commit genocide is so important to the ICTR, it is necessary to provide a
very brief overview on the role played by inciters and the effect it had on the Genocide in
Rwanda. Moreover, it is also necessary to discuss the background surrounding the
establishment of the ICTR and its temporal jurisdiction as it is the key obstacle
preventing the Prosecutor from prosecuting much of those responsible for the atrocities
that took place in 1994.
A. The Role Inciters Played and the Effects of It on the Genocide in Rwanda
The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 is one of the largest acts of
genocide since the concentration camps of World War II. It involved people ranging
from government officials to army personnel to ordinary citizens.2 Perhaps the biggest
cause of the genocide is the influential media that agitated the majority Hutu population
against the minority Tutsi population as radio is the most significant means of mass

2

See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
57-58 (Transnational Publishers 1998) [Reproduce in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
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communication throughout all of sub-Saharan Africa.3 In fact, the Radio-Television
Libre des Mille Collines (hereinafter “RTLM”) has been cited to have played a key role
in inciting violence against the Tutsi and fervently opposed the Arusha Accords which is
aimed at bringing peace to Rwanda.4
As a result of global intervention, mainly the U.N. and the French, along with the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (hereinafter “RPF”), the country-wide massacre came to a halt
as the war was declared over by the RPF on July 18, 1994.5 By that time, millions of
Rwandan citizens had been displaced from their homes into neighboring countries.6

But

more importantly, the massacre has left the number of unarmed civilians dead at
somewhere between 500,000 to 1 million due to the powerful words of the RTLM and
others.7
B. Establishment of the ICTR
In the case of Rwanda, national prosecutions seemed impossible as the Rwandese
justice system had been destroyed by the events that took place in 1994.8 As such, in the
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and after gathering the attention of the global

3

See C. SCHELTEMA & W. VAN DER WOLF, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, FACTS CASES
AND DOCUMENTS, VOLUME 1 82 (Global Law Association 1999) [Reproduce in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2] See also Alexander Dale, Countering Hate Messages that Lead to Violence: The United
Nation’s Chapter VII Authority to Use Radio Jamming to Halt Incendiary Broadcast, 11 Duke J. Comp. &
Int’l L. 109 (2001) [Reproduce in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
4

See Id. See also Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Int’l L.
365, 392 (1999) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4]

5

See Id. at 162.

6

See Id. at 166.

7

See Id. at 247.

8

See Human Rights First Publications, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Human Rights First Report on
the ICTR and National Trials, (July, 1997) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/
rwanda.htm (last accessed on 11/23/2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
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community, the ICTR was established by U.N. Security Council pursuant to its authority
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter on November 8, 1994.9 The U.N., building on the
recently established the ICTY, decided that the genocide in Rwanda required a similar
effort to insure the prosecution for the most serious crimes, such as genocide and crimes
against humanity. As such, like the ICTY, the ICTR incorporate international treaty law
and customary international law into its judgments.10
Under Article 1 of the Statute, the ICTR has the responsibility to prosecute
persons responsible for the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law in Rwanda or Rwandan citizens who committed those violations
outside of Rwanda from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2004.11 Under Article 2, the
Statute defined Genocide and made “Direct and public incitement to commit genocide”
punishable.12

In addition, Article 7 of the Statute established the ICTR’s temporal

jurisdiction to “extend to a period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31
December 1994.”13 This is to be contrasted with that of the ICTY where the temporal
jurisdiction was much longer as it covered any criminal acts that took place after January

9

See U.N.S.C. Res. 955 adopted November 8, 1994 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
See also U.N. CHARTER Chap. VII [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]
10

See Joshua Wallenstein, An Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of Causation in Prosecutions for
Incitement to Genocide, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 361 (November, 2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 15]
11

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra at note 1, art. 1. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27]

12

See Id. at art. 2.

13

Id. at, art. 7.
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1, 1991 and has no end date.14 As such, the ICTR cannot prosecute any individuals for
those crimes before or after 1994 even though there have been periodic international
humanitarian law violations before and after 1994.15
Naturally, the Rwandese Government was of the view that the temporal
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was too restrictive.16

The Rwandese representative had

proposed that account be taken of the period from the beginning of the armed conflict on
October 1, 1990, until July 17, 1994, when it terminated with the victory of the Rwandese
Patriotic Front, arguing that an international tribunal which refuses to consider the causes
of the genocide in Rwanda and its planning cannot be of any use because it will not
contribute to eradicating the culture of impunity or creating a climate conducive to
national reconciliation.17

However, from the perspective of the Security Council

members, the primary issue was whether application of Chapter VII to crimes committed
prior to the April 1994 genocide would be justified.18 During a similar discussion with
respect to the temporal jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the French representative
had pointed out that the competence of the Tribunal should not extend to crimes
predating the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the outbreak of the current

14

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 8. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 26] See also Mariann Wang, The International Tribunal for Rwanda:
Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 177, 196
(1995) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

15

See Christina Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U.
Int’l L. J. 163 (2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5]
16

See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: the Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment, 90 A.J.I.L. 501, 505 (July, 1996) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3]

17

See Id.

18

See Id.

7

conflicts because, under Chapter VII, the establishment of a tribunal would be authorized
only for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace, [and] not in order to punish earlier
crimes.19
Nevertheless, the concerns of the Rwandese Government were not entirely
disregarded. Although the crash of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi on 6 April 1994 is considered to be the event that triggered the civil war and the
acts of the genocide that followed, as the Secretary-General pointed out, the Security
Council decided that the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal would commence on
January 1, 1994, in order to capture the planning stage of the crimes.20
Another reason for the short temporal jurisdiction is funding as there was concern
by the Rwandese Government over the meager human and financial resources allocated
to the ICTR.21 Should the U.N. extend the temporal jurisdiction to 1990, it would require
much more resources to make the ICTR fully functional. Even now with the short
temporal period, ever since its creation, the ICTR had not received adequate monetary
support from the U.N. and the international community. Located in Arusha, Tanzania,
the ICTR still lacks the resources to fill its key staff positions.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. ICTR’s Ability to Prosecute Incitement that Took Place Outside of Its
Temporal Jurisdiction
The ICTR has been presented with the option to pursue the prosecution of cases
where incitement to commit genocide took place well before 1994. The most publicized
19

See Id.

20

See Id. at 508.

21

See Id.
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instance of that occurred in a Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board hearing in the
case of Leon Mugesera.

Mugesera was a Rwandan extremist that called upon his

supporter to massacre the Tutsi in a public speech on November 22, 1992.22
Mugesera fled Rwanda in 1993, well before the genocide took place thereby
making it very difficult for the Prosecutor to show a casual nexus with the events that
took place in the year after. While under deportation hearing, Mugesera was found to
have made a speech calling for the killing of the Tutsi population by an adjudicator of the
Immigration and Refugee Board (hereinafter “IRB”) of Canada. In his opinion, the
Canadian IRB adjudicator, Pierre Turmel wrote:
“In my analysis of the testimony and the documentary evidence, I
found that in my opinion Mr. Mugesera made a speech which incited
people to drive out and to murder the Tutsi. It is also established that
murders of Tutsis were in fact committed, and, on the basis of
probabilities, resulted from the call for murder thrown out by Mr.
Mugesera in his speech. The Tutsi, beyond a shadow of a doubt, form an
identifiable group of persons. They constituted an identified group and
they were a systematic and widespread target of the crime of murder.
The counseling or invitation thus issued to his audience establishes
personal participation in the offence. In addition, I find that this
participation was conscious, having regard to Mr. Mugesera's social
standing and privileged position. Mr. Mugesera's writings and statements
clearly attest to the conscious nature of this participation. I would add that
this counseling was consistent with the policy advocated by the MRND
[political party of former president Habyarimana, of which Mugesera was
a member], as established by the evidence.
Having regard to the socio-political context which prevailed at the
time in question, the assassination of members of this identifiable group
constituted in my opinion a crime against humanity within the meaning of
subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code, all of the physical and mental
elements of which are present. Did this crime constitute a contravention of
customary international law or conventional international law in Rwanda
at the time it was committed?

22

See William A. Schabas, International Conference: Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46
McGill L.J. 141, 157 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
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In my opinion, the speech made by Mr. Mugesera constitutes a
contravention of these provisions of the Convention, in that it is a direct
and public incitement to commit genocide.”23
However, in the final appeal for Mugesera of this decision, the Canada Federal
Court of Appeal overturned this decision that was previously affirmed by the Appeals
Board of Immigration and held that there was a lack of evidence to clearly establish that
Mugesera had committed incitement to commit genocide which would have made him
deportable.24 Specifically, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal pointed out that the
initial decision by the Minister to seek deportation and the decisions of the Appeal
Division and the Federal Court Trial Division were decisively influenced by a 1993
report of the International Commission of Inquiry (hereinafter “ICI”).25 According to the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, the “[t]estimony of a witness involved in the
preparation of the ICI report showed that the ICI concluded, without basis, in a manner
contrary to the evidence or on the basis of a different and deliberately truncated text of
the speech, that Leon Mugesera was a significant instigator of trouble and that he had ties
to the President and to death squads. Conclusions the witness drew in her expert report on
Leon Mugesera's role were without basis.”26 In addition, the Court found “[t]he witness's
attitude throughout her testimony disclosed clear bias against Leon Mugesera and a
determination to defend conclusions arrived at by the ICI.”27 As such, the Court deemed

23

Re Mugesera and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (11 July 1996), QML-95-00171 at 42, 55-56
(I.R.B.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25] See also Schabas, supra note 21 at 158.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

24

See Mugesera c. Canada, 2003 CAF 325 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17]

25

See Id. at 3.

26

Id.

27

Id.
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the ICI report itself to be unreliable in concluding that the Appeal Division acted in a
patently unreasonable way by relying on the findings of fact made by the ICI.28 Because
the ICI report's conclusions regarding Leon Mugesera completely lacked credibility, the
Court found that the ICI report should not have been taken into consideration.29
Moreover, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal found that the Appeal Division
had made a patently unreasonable error in finding Leon Mugesera deportable by not
accepting the testimony of one of the experts on the analysis of Leon Mugesera's speech
where the testimony showed that certain comments in Leon Mugesera’s speech had been
misinterpreted.30

In that testimony, the expert had concluded that the message

communicated was not, objectively speaking, that is, after analyzing the speech and its
context as a whole, a message inciting to murder, hatred or genocide.31 Moreover, that
expert had also concluded that the speech by Leon Mugesera was not such a message in a
subjective sense, either.32 In essence, the Court found nothing in evidence to suggest that
Leon Mugesera intended under cover of a bellicose speech that would be justified in the
circumstances, to impel toward racism and murder an audience which he knew would be
inclined to act on such a message.33 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no
evidence, on a balance of probabilities that Leon Mugesera had any guilty intent.34

28

See Id.

29

See Id.

30

See Id.

31

See Id.

32

See Id.

33

See Id.

34

See Id.
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In addition, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal also found an absence of casual
nexus between Leon Mugesera’s speech and the genocide that occurred in 1994.35 It
opined that:
“The speech appeared to have had a negligible impact in Rwanda in the
days and weeks that followed. The fact that only three newspapers out of
Rwanda's many publications mentioned the speech, that the national radio
mentioned it in a brief and dismissive way, and that neither the foreign
press nor human rights agencies in Rwanda at the time mentioned it
supported the theory that the speech had been mischaracterized and that it
did not have any impact on the conflict in Rwanda. The evident lack of
impact on the life of Rwandans was more impressive than the official
manhunt brought by political adversaries who were members of the
coalition government. It was not surprising that L[eon] M[ugesera] was
being sought given that he criticized members of the government and had
asked to have certain government officials taken to court. L[eon]
M[ugesera] was first seen as attacking the security of the State, then
inciting to hatred and genocide, than as having planned the genocide. The
manipulation of charges was suspicious and suggested that L[eon]
M[ugesera]'s speech in 1992 was merely a pretext used by his political
opponents to discredit him. The injunction to prosecute and bench warrant
in November 1992 had nothing to do with the fact that the speech may
have
been
a
call
to
murder,
hatred
or
genocide.”36
Using those reasons, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal found Leon
Mugesera, at least for immigration purposes, not deportable because there lack evidence
linking him to committing incitement to commit genocide.37
Meanwhile at the ICTR, the ICTR Prosecutor had decided not to pursue charging
Mugesera with incitement to commit genocide because the act occurred and halted
outside of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction and the argument that his speech had effects
during the massacres of 1994 would be difficult to sustain.38

35

See Id.

36

Id.

37

See Id.
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Therefore, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR would preclude the prosecution
of those incitements to commit genocide that occurred and halted prior to 1994 for which
the Prosecutor could not establish a casual nexus between the incitement and the
subsequent commission of genocide in 1994.39
B. Reconcilability of ICTR’s Temporal Jurisdiction with the Genocide
Convention
Under a literal interpretation of the Statute, the ICTR may not prosecute those acts
which are in violation of international humanitarian laws if they were committed either
before or after 1994. However, under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Hereinafter “Genocide Convention”), direct and
public incite to commit genocide should be punished regardless of when it was
committed.40 The handicapping temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR will severely limit its
ability to punish those who played a hand in the genocide in Rwanda. Under such limited
jurisdiction, the ICTR is powerless to punish those for crimes outlined in the Genocide
Convention and in its own Statute that was committed prior to 1994.
With respect to Rwanda, the acts of incitement to commit genocide are especially
significant as they arguably played the most important role in causing the genocide in
1994 since there is evidence the genocide was a carefully orchestrated event for which
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planning had begun prior to 1994.41 Hence, these crimes should be on the top of the list
for prosecution as oppose to being on the list of non-prosecutions.
As stated in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, the goals of the Genocide
Convention are to both prevent and punish acts of genocide.42 However, during the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly revision of the Ad Hoc Committee’s drafting of the
Convention, there was much disagreement over the inclusion of incitement to commit
genocide as an inchoate crime due to strong support for freedom of speech from countries
such as the United States.43 On the other hand, countries such as Poland noted that
prevention of genocide is just as important as punishment such that freedom of press
“must not be so great as to permit the press to engage in incitement to genocide.”44
By the time the Convention was over, original draft of “direct public incitement to
any act of genocide, whether the incitement be successful or not” had became “Direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.”45 Nonetheless, the prevention of genocide is still
half of the purpose of the Genocide Convention as ratified by the General Assembly.46
As such, the lack of jurisdiction for the ICTR to prosecute those who publicly incited the
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masses to commit genocide prior to 1994 fails to uphold the first purpose of the Genocide
Convention.
It is important to note that the temporal jurisdiction of ICTR is not required by the
Genocide Convention for which the ICTR in entrusted with enforcing.47 In theory, the
parties who commit such acts should not enjoy any safe harboring provided by the
temporal jurisdiction placed on the ICTR. Moreover, the prohibition on genocide has
achieved the status of jus cogens, and thereby would bind all members of the
international community, including Rwanda, regardless of whether it had ratified the
Genocide Convention.48 In this case, it is important to note that Rwanda has ratified the
Genocide Convention.49
While it is true that Article VI of the Genocide Convention obligates domestic
tribunals to prosecute acts of genocide and genocide related acts committed within its
borders, domestic jurisdiction to prosecute genocide under Article VI is a hollow
obligation because genocide is most frequently perpetrated with the assistance or
acquiescence of the state such as is the case in Rwanda.50 As such, Article VI of the
Genocide Convention specifically envisioned prosecution of genocide or genocide related
act by international tribunals such as the ICTR with respect to countries like Rwanda.51
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Therefore, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR can not be reconciled with the
Genocide Convention of 1948.

Hence, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR will

seriously hamper the ICTR’s duty to investigate and prosecute all of those who are
responsible for the atrocities of the 1994 massacre instead of just those who happens to
fall within the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction in order to conform to the principles of the
Genocide Convention of 1948. As such, those most responsible for the genocide will
never be brought to justice and the purpose of the ICTR will never be fulfilled.
C. Incitement to Commit Genocide
While both the Genocide Convention and the ICTR specifically outlaw “Direct
and public incitement to commit genocide,” the issue arises in what constitutes as “Direct
and public incitement to commit genocide.”52 Therefore, in order to punish those who
commit this violation, one must understand what constitutes “Direct and public
incitement to commit genocide.”
i. What Constitutes Incitement
As the ICTY has noted, when an individual’s conduct directly and substantially
affects and supports the commission of an international offense, that individual should be
held criminally liable for his actions.53 Yet while most states agree that inciters should be
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held accountable, they disagree on whether a separate provision enumerating direct and
public incitement is necessary.54

Many of the states reasoned that the incitement

provision is superfluous because inciters’ actions would fall under conspiracy or
complicity to commit genocide.55

This reasoning however, failed to recognize the

damage one inciter could cause while acting alone such as the case with RTLM in
Rwanda.56 Prior to and during the genocide in Rwanda, the RTLM, a local radio station,
broadcasted instructions to genocide which has been cited to have played a large role in
helping cause the massacre of possibly one million unarmed civilians.57 In addition, in
June of 1994, in the midst of the massacre, Jean Kambanda, the former Prime minister of
Rwanda even went of the air at RTLM and encouraged the station to continue the
incitement and called for genocide against the Tutsi.58

Moreover, Kambanda also

preached genocide in public engagements and at governmental meetings and freely
uttered incendiary phrases to inflame the masses.59
As seen in the cases such as Kambanda, some statements of certain individual
inciters are able to make a much more significant impact on people than those statements
made by some individuals in concert could ever make.60
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The international standard for incitement to commit genocide as decided by the
International Military Tribunal (hereinafter “IMT”) at Nuremberg requires explicit calls
to commit genocide, not just general arousement.61 Yet, this standard was not codified
by the Genocide Convention as the IMT had not expressly provided for the punishment
of genocide.62
ii. The “Directness” Standard
Aside from the incitement standard, the also exists the standard for “Directness.”
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR held “that the direct element of incitement should be
viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content.”63 As such, the ICTR concluded
that the standard of directness is factual inquiry that focuses on “whether the persons for
whom the message was intended immediately grasped the implications thereof.”64
Hence, in the case of Akayesu, the Trial Chamber looked to whether the audience
construed Akayesu’s speech as a call to kill the Tutsi.65 If the Court could determine that
the listener would interpret the speech to be calling for the killing of Tutsis, then the
speech would be direct.
iii. The “Imminence” Standard
60
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Another standard to be met is the standard of imminence.66 That is, how likely
the incitement will produce imminent lawless action. As such, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
the ICTR required proof of possible link between incitement and the commission of
genocide.67 Though not specifically required by Article 3 of the Genocide Convention
and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR found imminence to be a requirement for the
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.68
As applied to Akayesu, the imminence requirement was satisfied when the ICTR
found that Akayesu, the mayor of a commune addressed a crowd in which he encouraged
the killing of Tutsi and it just happens that the killing of Tutsi in Akayesu’s commune
began immediately after his speech.69

The ICTR noted that merely a possible

coincidence would not suffice but proof of a possible casual link must exist for
imminence standard to be satisfied.70
While the ICTR found actual casual link between the Akayesu’s incitement and
the killing of the Tutsi in his commune, it is important to note that only a possible casual
link is required such that incitement is punishable regardless of whether or not it was
successful.71 As it is similar to other inchoate offenses, direct and public incitement is a
separate and specific crime which is punishable by the virtue of the criminal act alone.72
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As such, because incitement is a crime in itself regardless of its success, under the
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR, it can be prosecuted if it occurred in 1994 and only a
possible casual link is required to satisfy the imminence standard.
D. Incitement to Commit Genocide as an Inchoate Crime
The primary international tool for criminalizing genocide is the Genocide
Convention.73 Under the Genocide Convention, there is no requirement that a genocidist
achieves him or her aims or that the group attacked actually suffer partial or total
destruction.74 Rather, the crime is complete when certain enumerated acts are committed
and target group members with the requisite intent.75 As such, those crimes would be
considered to be inchoate crimes.76
Furthermore, irrespective of the temporal jurisdiction, Article 6 of the Rwanda
Statute, relating to the basis for individual criminal responsibility, as well as Article 2(3),
which enumerates the punishable acts of genocide, would presumably cover acts such as
planning, instigating, ordering, or otherwise aiding and abetting a crime that commenced
prior to January 1, 1994, so long as there was a causal nexus between those acts and the
completion of the crime during 1994.77
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responsibility that extends from the planning and preparation phases to the execution
phase of the genocide.
However, inchoate crimes are punishable irrespective of a nexus with the
subsequent commission of genocide. With that respect, Incitement to commit genocide is
characterized as an inchoate crime according to the Travaux Preparatoires of the
Genocide Convention.78

As such, the crime of incitement to commit genocide is

complete when that incitement is done with the specific intent for genocide to result
regardless of the success of the incitement in causing that intended genocide. Moreover,
as an inchoate crime, the crime of incitement to commit genocide is to be deemed as
continuing until the completion of the acts contemplated.79
Since evidence of a linkage with other acts is not required, this provision would
seem to give the prosecution a considerable advantage when it comes to the prosecution
of incitement to commit genocide.80 Yet when taken in conjunction with the Tribunal's
temporal jurisdiction, this advantage is negated as it would not extend to acts of
incitement completed prior to 1994.81

For example, it is alleged by the Rwandese

Government and the Canadian IRB that, in a statement made on November 26, 1992, Dr.
Leon Mugesera, one of the advisers to President Habyarimana, called for the
extermination of the Tutsi in what is described as a final solution, Rwandese-style.82
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Within the confines of the Rwanda Statute's temporal jurisdiction, the incitement to
commit genocide allegedly committed in 1992 would fall under the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal (e.g., as planning, instigating, or aiding and abetting under Article 6, or
incitement to genocide under Article 2(3)(c)) only if a causal nexus is established with
the subsequent commission of genocide in 1994.83 Therefore, due to the inability to
establish a casual nexus with the subsequent commission of genocide along with no
evidence that Mugesera had incited others to commit genocide in 1994, the ICTR will not
be able to prosecute Mugesera for his actions in 1992 because the continuing crime that
he had allegedly committed halted outside of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction.
E. Incitement to Commit Genocide as Used in the ICTR Media Case:
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze
In a landmark decision by the ICTR in December of 2003, the ICTR found
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze guilty of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICTR.84
i. Case Background
Nahimana was a former history professor who was in control of the RTLM ever
since its foundation.85 Over the course of being in control of RTLM, Nahimana was
responsible for numerous broadcasts of messages calling for the extermination of the
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Tutsi population.86 He was found guilty of direct and public incitement of genocide for
his role in RTLM programming inciting violence against the Tutsi population.87
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was a lawyer who was also in control of the RTLM as
well as being one of the principal founders of the Coalition for the Defense of the
Republic (hereinafter “CDR”) who played a leading role in its formation and
development.88 He was found guilty of direct and public incitement of genocide for his
role in RTLM programming inciting violence against the Tutsi population as well as for
failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the acts of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide caused by other members of the CDR.89
Hassan Ngeze was the owner, founder and editor of the [newspaper], Kangura.
He controlled the publication and was responsible for its contents.90 He was also one of
the founding members of the CDR.91 He was found guilty of direct and public incitement
to commit genocide for his role in using the newspaper to “instill hatred, promote fear,
and incite genocide” against the Tutsi population.92 Moreover, Ngeze was also found
guilty of direct and public incitement to commit genocide for his role in driving “around
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with a megaphone in his vehicle, mobilizing the Hutu population to come to CDR
meetings and spreading the message that the [Tutsi population] would be terminated.”93
ii. The Issue of Advocacy of Idea and Advocacy of Violence in Nahimana
The ICTR in Nahimana was given the task of distinguishing between the
advocacy of ideas from the advocacy of violence.94

The ICTR acknowledge this

important distinction and made attempts to articulate the difference between the two
kinds of advocacy.95
In its decision, the ICTR acknowledge the fact that some of the Kangura articles
and the RTLM broadcasts conveyed “historical information, political analysis, or
advocacy of an ethnic consciousness regarding the inequitable distribution of privileges
in Rwanda.”96 In this case, the ICTR found those articles and broadcasts to fall “squarely
within the scope of speech that is protected by the right to freedom of expression.”97
However, the ICTR also stressed the intent of the speech in deciding the guilty of
the RTLM broadcasts and the Kangura articles. In its analysis, the ICTR considered four
factors: 1) the accuracy of the statement, 2) the tone of the statement, 3) the context in
which the statement was made, and 4) the positioning of the media.98
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Under the first factor, the ICTR reasoned that if a statement was true or even
“information[al] in nature,” while it might generate resentment or even a desire to take
action, the impact would merely be the result of the information conveyed by the
statement rather than the statement itself.99 However, in the event the statement is false,
the inaccuracies will be viewed as an indicator that the intent of the statement was not to
convey information but rather to promote hatred and inflame ethnic tensions.100 With
that reasoning, the ICTR concluded that the statement “the Tutsi are the ones with all the
money” would be distinct from a statement regarding the Tutsi owning a percentage of
the taxis.101 Thus, the former statement would be considered advocacy with intent for
violence while the latter would be merely advocacy for idea.
Under the second factor, the ICTR stressed the equal importance of the tone of the
statement in the determination of whether the intent of the statement was to educate or to
preach violence when it stated that “[t]he tone of the statement is as relevant to this
determination as is its content.”102 The ICTR concluded “that Nahimana was aware of
the relevance of the tone to culpability was evidenced by his reluctance to acknowledge
the text of the broadcast, ‘they are the ones with all the money,’ when he was questioned
on it [and] eventually, he said…that he would not have used such language but would
have expressed the reality in a different way.”103
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Under the third factor, the ICTR considered “the context in which the statement is
made to be important.”104 The ICTR states that “a statement of ethnic generalization
provoking resentment against members of that ethnicity would have a heightened impact
in the context of a genocidal environment. It would be more likely to lead to violence.
At the same time the environment would be an indicator that incitement to violence was
the intent of the statement.”105
And under the last factor, the ICTR “recognizes that some media are advocacyoriented and considers that the issue of importance to its findings is not whether the
media played an advocacy role but rather the content of what it was actually
advocating.”106 Therefore, the actual positioning of Kangura and RTLM as advocates of
violence indicates the real intent of its articles and broadcasts.107 According to the ICTR,
“in cases where the media disseminates views that constitutes ethnic hatred and calls to
violence for informative or educational purposes, a clear distancing from these is
necessary to avoid conveying an endorsement of the message and in fact to convey a
counter-message to ensure that no harm results from the broadcast.”108 In the ICTR’s
view, the RTLM and Kangura’s failure to distance themselves from the message of
ethnic hatred meant they were endorsing the advocacy of violence against the Tutsi.109
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In its decision, the ICTR equated the fact that genocide actually occurring in
Rwanda with the finding of intent for incitement to commit genocide.110 In its reasoning,
the ICTR noted that “incitement is a crime is a crime regardless of whether it had the
effect it intends to have. In determining whether communications represent an intent to
cause genocide and thereby constitute incitement, the Chamber considers it significant
that in fact genocide occurred. That the media in tended to have this effect is evidenced
in part by the fact it did have this effect.”111
iii. The Stretch of the Imminence Requirement in Nahimana
The imminence requirement used in Akayesu was stretched, if not eliminated by
the ICTR in Nahimana. As used in Akayesu, the imminence requirement is used to
establish a link between the speech and the resulting crime.112 While the ICTR held in
Akayesu that the immediate killing of Tutsi in the commune after a speech by Akayesu
promoting the killing of the Tutsi population was what satisfy the imminence
requirement, the ICTR in Nahimana allowed for a much longer time in its definition of
“imminence.”113

In Nahimana, the ICTR held that direct and public incitement to

commit genocide is an “inchoate crime which continues until the completion of the acts
contemplated.”114 The ICTR determined that the publication of Kangura prior to 1994
fell within its temporal jurisdiction because “the alleged impact of which culminated in
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events that took place in 1994.”115 Similarly, the ICTR concluded that the entirety of
RTLM broadcasting falls within its temporal jurisdiction because “the alleged impact
culminated in events that took place in 1994.”116
With that said however, it is important to note that the ICTR originally interpreted
its temporal jurisdiction restrictively when it held that no facts “pre-dating or post-dating
1994 could be used to support a count in the indictment; however, alleged facts which
took place during those times can be used to establish an "historical context" for an
indictment.”117 Only later in its final judgment did the Trial Chamber of the ICTR make
a final ruling and held that such material fell within the temporal jurisdiction of its
Statute.118 Moreover, an ICTR Appeals Chamber has ordered the withdrawal of all
reference to facts predating 1994 from specific counts of the indictment.119
iv. Reconcilability of Nahimana with Mugesera
As mentioned before, Leon Mugesera was suspected of committing incitement to
commit genocide. As such, the question of why are Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze
prosecuted and not Mugesera when all four have been suspected of inciting others to
commit genocide must be addressed.
Nahimana is different from the Mugesera scenario for several reasons. The
factual difference between the two is that unlike Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, the
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possible incitement to commit genocide made by Mugesera halted prior to 1994 whereas
the RTLM and Kangura’s incitement to commit genocide continued well into 1994. As
such, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze’s actions fell within the ICTR’s temporal
jurisdiction and may be prosecuted by the ICTR because inchoate crimes such as
incitement to commit genocide is deemed to be continuing until the completion of the
acts contemplated.120
Moreover, as the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal have concluded, there lack
clear evidence that Mugesera did indeed incite others to commit genocide.121 As such, it
is quite possible that the ICTR have not charged Mugesera with incitement to commit
genocide because of the lack of such evidence.
Should the ICTR uncover sufficient evidence to overcome the burden of proving
that Mugesera have incited others to commit genocide, it would still be faced with the
obstacle of overcoming the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR to prosecute Mugesera for
such crime.
In Nahimana, because some of the incitements to commit genocide being
prosecuted took place in 1994, the ICTR enjoyed the advantage of the characterization of
incitement to commit genocide as an inchoate crime in that it simply have to prove that
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze incited others to commit genocide in 1994 with the
intention of causing genocide.122 It does not have to prove however, that their incitement
had a link with the genocide that eventually took place.123
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In contrast, the alleged incitement of Mugesera took place in 1992, well outside of
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction and there exist no evidence of any future incitement to
commit genocide by Mugesera in 1994.124 As such, the characterization of incitement to
commit genocide as an inchoate crime will be of no use to the ICTR because the
completion of the acts contemplated by Mugesera took place before 1994. As such, since
the prosecution of inchoate crimes outside of 1994 is not authorized by the ICTR Statute
and given the current fact pattern, the ICTR have no jurisdiction to prosecute Leon
Mugesera. Therefore, in order to prosecute Mugesera for incitement to commit genocide,
the Prosecutor must establish a casual nexus between his alleged incitements with the
subsequent commission of genocide in 1994.125 Unless that can established, the ICTR
will have to leave the responsibility of prosecuting those like Mugesera to the Rwanda
national court.126
F. ICTR-made Exceptions to the Statute’s Temporal Jurisdiction
As mentioned in the foregoing, during the course of the Nahimana trial, the
defense counsel made several motions objecting to the inclusion of several acts of
incitement which took place before 1994 that was included in the indictment citing
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction.

123

Id.

124

See Schabas, supra note 22 at 157. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

125

See Akhavan, Supra Note 16 at 506. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3]

126

See Human Rights First Publications, supra note 8 at 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 8] See also Sriram, Chandra. Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses. 19 Am.
U. Int’l L. Rev. 301 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14] Due to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the ICTR, the Rwandan national courts will be able to ask for the extradition of Mugesera
from Canada and then prosecute him should the ICTR be limited by its temporal jurisdiction.

30

In Prosecutor v. Jean-Batiste Gatete, the ICTR in a chamber decision noted that
in Nahimana “The Appeals Chamber held that an accused cannot be held accountable for
his crimes committed prior to 1994, and that such events would not be referred to except
for historical purposes or information.”127 Furthermore, the motion decision in Gatete
stressed the concurring opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in holding that “evidence of
events prior to 1994 could form a basis upon which to draw reasonable inferences
regarding elements of crimes committed within the temporal jurisdiction, for example,
intent, if it is to prove that the element existed during the commission of the crime in
1994.”128 In addition, “such evidence can also be used to establish that a conspiracy
agreement made before 1994 was fulfilled or renewed in 1994. Moreover, pre-1994
evidence may be admissible to prove a pattern, design or systemic course of conduct by
the accused, or to provide background evidence.”129 As such, the ICTR have begun to
see incitements to commit genocide before 1994 as both evidence and as inchoate crimes
that is to be prosecuted if at all possible.
Similarly, the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba echoed that view on August 31,
2004 in its decision on a defense motion to preclude prosecution evidence.130 In its
decision, it confirmed the existence of “three bases of relevance for pre-1994 evidence,
which are exceptions to the general inadmissibility of pre-1994 evidence: (i) evidence
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relevant to an offence continuing into 1994; (ii) evidence providing a context or
background; or (iii) similar fact evidence.”131
As such, those are the only exceptions to the pre-1994 inadmissibility rule as
established by the temporal jurisdiction of the Statute made by the ICTR. Therefore, in
order for the ICTR to consider any pre-1994 acts of incitement to commit genocide, it
must fit within the three exceptions.
Thereby, in applying this line of analysis to the situation with Mugesera, his
alleged incitement to commit genocide will likely not be allowed to be introduced as
evidence much less to be prosecuted. Because there is no evidence of any incitement on
Mugesera’s part that took place in 1994, his actions in 1992 are not relevant to an offense
continuing into 1994. In addition, his 1992 acts could not provide context or background
to the non-existence offense that took place in 1994. And moreover, Mugesera’s acts in
1992 can not be used to show similar patterns of conduct when there is no act that took
place in 1994 to compare to.
In this case, the exceptions made by the ICTR in Gatete and Simba really do not
do much, if at all for the prosecution of incitement to commit genocide. In the event that
there exists a crime of incitement to commit genocide which took place in 1994, there
would be no need to introduce past acts of incitement in order provide context,
background, relevance, or similar fact pattern because as an inchoate crime, the mere
existence of an incitement that took place in 1994 would be enough for the ICTR to
prosecute the incitements that took place prior to 1994.
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As such, the best way to

prosecute incitement to commit genocide which took place prior to 1994 is by establish
evidence of further incitements that took place in 1994.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, following the Travaux Preparatoires of the Genocide Convention,
the ICTR has also classified incitement to commit genocide as an inchoate crime thereby
negating the necessity of the success of such incitement in causing genocide and deeming
incitement to commit genocide as continuing until the completion of the acts
contemplated. As such, combined with the opinions of Nahimana and Akayesu, the
criminal act of incitement to commit genocide requires no more than a possibility of a
casual nexus to the genocide in 1994 in order for it to be prosecuted at the ICTR if any
incitement took place within 1994.
However, should the incitement to commit genocide halt before 1994, the ICTR
may not prosecute those who committed incitement to commit genocide prior to 1994
unless there is a casual nexus between the incitement and the genocide that occurred in
1994. In the event there exists evidence of a casual nexus between incitement that took
place prior to 1994 and the genocide, the ICTR would have jurisdiction to consider those
acts. However, it is important to note that due to the mass scale of the genocide,
establishing actual connection between incitement and genocide had proven to be
difficult. As such, the prosecution by the ICTR of incitements to commit genocide which
took place and halted before 1994 will severely be limited by the temporal jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the ICTR is limited to prosecuting acts of incitement to commit
genocide only if a casual nexus between the incitement and the genocide can be
established, it provides context for another crime, it provides a historical background for
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another crime, or it was similar to the facts surrounding another crime. As such, the
crime of incitement to commit genocide is a continuing crime such that acts committed
outside of the temporal jurisdiction can be considered in prosecuting an accused so long
as the prosecution is able to meet the conditions set forth in this memorandum.
Otherwise, acts of incitement to commit genocide committed outside of the temporal
jurisdiction, even being deemed as continuing crimes, would not be considered in
prosecuting an accused if none of the aforementioned conditions are met.
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